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tion to be a claim for damages or of any threatened litigation or
other resort to a remedy. The notification which saves the buyer's
rights under this Article need only be such as informs the seller
that the transaction is claimed to involve a breach, and thus opens
the way for normal settlement through negotiations. 28 [Emphasis
added.]
Thus, the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code in Wisconsin will
establish a standard for the element of "reasonable time" required for
proper notification of breach of warranty. The requirement of adequate
notification, as modified by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in the Woiciuk
case, seems to conform to the philosophy of the Uniform Commercial
Code, set forth above. JAmES Wm. DVYER
Torts: Abolishment of Parental Immunity in Wisconsin-In re-
cent years the Wisconsin Supreme Court has been systematically abro-
gating the doctrine of immunity. Charitable immunity in Kojis v. Dod-
tor's Hospital,' governmental immunity in Holytz v. City of Milwaukee,2
religious immunity in Widell v. Holy Trini/y Catholic Church,3 and
most recently parental immunity in Goller v. White4 have been elimi-
nated. Under the holding in the Goller case, a parent may now be liable
to his child for negligence, unless the alleged act involves an exercise
of parental authority or ordinary parental discretion with respect to
the provision of food, clothing, housing and other care.
Daniel G. Goller, a twelve-year-old, was injured while riding on a
farm tractor driven by his foster father, James J. White. The boy's
guardian ad litem brought an action against White and Farmers Mu-
tual Automobile Insurance Company to recover damages, alleging that
White was negligent in allowing the child to ride on the draw-bar of the
tractor and that Farmers Mutual had issued a policy of liability insur-
ance to White which covered the child's injuries. The trial court dis-
missed both complaints on the grounds that the insurance policy afforded
no coverage to the plaintiff and that White stood in loco parentis to the
plaintiff and could not be held liable in negligence.
On appeal, the supreme court considered the parental immunity
doctrine, first noting the growing tendency to depart from the holding
in Wick v. Wick5 which was cited by the trial court as authority for its
determination. The rationale of the Wick decision preventing a child
from suing his parent for negligence, was that a contrary holding would
introduce discord and contention into the family relationship. The de-
28 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §2-607, comment 4 (Official Text, 1962).
1 12 Wis. 2d 367, 107 N.W. 2d 131, 107 N.W. 2d 292 (1961).
2 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W. 2d 618 (1962).
3 19 Wis. 2d 648, 121 N.W. 2d 249 (1963).
4 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W. 2d 193 (1963).
5 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927).
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cision in Wait v. Pierce,6 permitting a wife to sue her husband, is some-
times distinguished because it rests upon statute.7 However, the supreme
court saw no difference in principle between the two situations, and
from its experience since the Wait case, it doubted that permitting a
child to bring suit against a negligent parent would have any disruptive
effect on family harmony. The court also noted that, at common law,
suits are maintainable between parent and child concerning property
and contract rights" and that the law should protect the personal rights
of a minor as zealously as his property rights.9
In attempting to show judicial hostility to the parental immunity rule
in other jurisdictions, several exceptions to the rule were mentioned in
the Goller opinion. The Missouri court recently held that the rule did
not apply to a suit brought by the child against the personal representa-
tive of a deceased parent.' 0 Another exception recognized by some courts
has arisen where the parent's tort constituted wilful misconduct." The
courts of Ohio and Washington have held that the parental immunity
rule does not apply if the parent was engaged in his business or occu-
pation at the time he committed the negligent act.12 Finally, two courts
have grounded recovery by a minor child against a parent on the ex-
istence of insurance.'
3
In accordance with the majority of decisions from other states, the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin had long refused to consider the existence
of liability insurance a sufficient basis for departing from the Wick
rule." But in the Goller case, the court decided that the wide prevalence
of liability insurance and its tendency to negate any family discord were
proper elements to consider in deciding whether or not to abrogate
parental immunity.
In Schwenkhoff v. Farmers Mut. Automobile Ins. Co.,' 5 the court
decided that the Wisconsin legislature's action in rejecting a bill that
r 191 Wis. 202, 209 N.W. 475, 210 N.W. 822 (1926).
7Wis. STAT. §246.07 (1961).
S Preston v. Preston, 102 Conn. 96, 128 Atl. 292 (1925) ; Lamb v. Lamb, 146 N.Y.
317, 41 N.E. 26 (1895) ; Hollingsworth v. Beaver, 59 S.W. 464 (Tenn. Ch. App.
1900) ; King v. Sells, 193 Wash. 294, 75 P. 2d 130 (1938) ; Note, 33 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV., 310, 312 (1959) ; Note, 51 HARV. L. REv., 1451 (1938).
9 Comment, 41 MARQ. L. REV., 188, 195 (1957).10Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W. 2d 68 (Mo. 1960); Palcsey v. Tepper, 71
N.J. Super. 294, 176 A. 2d 818 (1962); Davis v. Smith, 126 F. Supp. 497
(E.D. Pa. 1954).
"Emery v. Emery, 45 Cal. 2d 421, 289 P. 2d 218 (1955) ; Wright v. Wright, 85
Ga. App. 721, 70 S.E. 2d 152 (1952) ; Mudd v. Matsoukas, 7 11. 2d 608, 131
N.E. 2d 525 (1956); Mahnke v. Moore, 197 Md. 61, 77 A. 2d 923 (1951);
Harbin v. Harbin, Sup., 218 N.Y.S. 2d 308, aff'd, 16 A.D. 2d 696, 227 N.Y.S. 2d
1023 (1961) ; Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Or. 282, 218 P. 2d 445 (1950).
12 Signs v. Signs, 156 Ohio St. 566, 103 N.E. 2d 743 (1952) ; Borst v. Borst ,41
Wash. 2d 642,251 P. 2d 149 (1952).
13 Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E. 2d 343 (1939); Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W. Va.
17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932).
14 Lasecki v. Kabara, 235 Wis. 645, 294 N.W. 33 (1940) ; Fidelity Savings Bank
v. Aulik, 252 Wis. 602, 32 N.W. 2d 613 (1948).15 11 Wis. 2d 97, 104 N.W. 2d 154 (1960).
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would have abolished the immunity foreclosed the court from doing so.
In so concluding, the court adhered to the long-established judicial policy
of not overruling its past decisions where the legislature had acted in
the matter. This policy was later overturned in Holytz v. City of Ml-
waukee,1 where the court held that it should change a court-made rule
of law when deemed necessary in the interests of justice. Thus, the court
was no longer bound by the Schwenkhoff reasoning in the Goller case.1 7
It seems apparent that with the abrogation of parental immunity
future litigation will involve only parents who are covered, or believe
they are covered, by a liability insurance policy. A child would have
little to gain from a suit against an uninsured parent, who has an exist-
ing legal duty to render medical care to his injured dependent. On the
other hand, a judgment against an insured parent would work to the
mutual advantage of both parties. Every parent derives a benefit, direct
or indirect, from the enhancement of his child's separate estate. Under
Wisconsin law,' the insurance company would pay the recovery to the
clerk of court who would then invest it for the child, pay the child's
natural guardian, or make payment directly to the child.
The probability of mutual benefit to parent and child, where insur-
ance coverage exists, suggests the possibility of a conspiracy against the
insurance company. However, the insured party is usually required by
policy provisions to assist the insurer in the defense of any action
brought against the insured. 19 Such cooperation ordinarily consists in
helping to secure the attendance of witnesses and informing the insur-
ance company of all facts connected with the accident.2 0 Failure of the
insured parent to comply with these express conditions requiring co-
operation releases the insurer from liability under the policy,21 but mere
sympathy for the child's cause of action, or aid given in securing evi-
dence does not defeat recovery on the policy.'2 If the insurer is able
to establish collusion on the part of the parent in permitting the child
to secure a judgment against him, the policy is avoided,'2 but it is often
difficult in a particular case to determine whether or not there has been
16 Note 2 supra.
17 Chief Justice Brown, who concurred in the Goller result because he did not
believe a true parental relationship existed, nevertheless disagreed with the
majority in principle, saying that the court should refrain from announcing
public policy in a field primarily within the legislative function.
Is Wis. STAT. §§269.80(3), 319.04(2) (1961).
10 VANCE, INSURANCE 1003 (3d ed. 1951).
20 Coleman v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 247 N.Y. 271, 160 N.E. 367 (1927);
Rohlf v. Great American Indemnity Co., 27 Ohio App. 208, 161 N.E. 232 (1927).
21 Guerin v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 107 Conn. 649, 142 At. 268 (1928).
22 Johnson v. Johnson, 228 Minn. 282, 37 N.W. 2d 1 (1939).
23 Bassi v. Bassi, 165 Minn. 100, 205 N.W. 947 (1925) ; Collins v. Standard Acc.
Ins. Co., 170 Ky. 27, 185 S.W. 112 (1916); State Farm Mutual Auto Ins. Co.
v. Bonacci, 111 F. 2d 412 (8th Cir. 1940); Ohio Cas. Co. v. Swan, 89 F. 2d
719 (8th Cir. 1937).
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collusion.24 For example, the mere fact that the insured openly expressed
a desire that the injured plaintiff, his wife, secure a judgment against
him has been held insufficient to establish collusion.
25
This brings up a consideration of great importance which has been
overlooked in cases involving parental immunity-namely, the relation-
ship between the parties which is totally unlike that existing between
husband and wife. It is not enough to say that, if family discord is no
longer a problem, immunity may be discarded in an area where the in-
surance company will bear the ultimate liability. The duty of a parent
does not cease when he has provided a harmonious home. He also has
an obligation to instill in his child a right moral sense.
No minor child, on his own initiative, would prosecute an action
against his parent, except in the most unusual circumstances. The neces-
sity of the parent exercising some influence over the child, in order to
successfully recover from the insurance company, distinguishes this
from all other types of immunity cases. Whether the degree of conspiracy
reaches the point where the insurer may avoid the policy is immaterial.
In this writer's opinion, when the negligent parent takes a child of tender
age to an attorney for the purpose of preparing a law suit against the
parent and his insurance company, the child is provided with impres-
sions of equity and justice which strike at the very heart of our judicial
system. A. WILLIAM FINKE
Criminal Law: Conditional Pardoning of Undesirables-Peti-
tioner, a person imprisoned for burglary, signed a pardon agreement
conditioned upon his leaving Utah. The pardon provided that he be
re-imprisoned if he ever returned. Upon release, he ignored the agree-
ment and remained in Utah. State authorities promptly returned him
to prison, whereupon he applied for a writ of habeas corpus which was
denied in the trial court.
The Utah Supreme Court, basing its decision upon the contract
theory of pardoning, upheld the lower court's ruling. It reasoned that
since the promise required of petitioner raised no constitutional objec-
tion, it could support a binding contract.2 Petitioner's assertion that the
state's action amounted to banishment in violation of the state3 and
federal4 constitutions was deemed erroneous, for he was given a free
24 Collusion may not be inferred merely from the close relationship between the
plaintiff and the defendant. Conroy v. Commercial Cas Co., 292 Pa. 219, 140
Atl. 905 (1928).
25 Maryland Cas. Co. v. Lamarre, 83 N.H. 206, 140 Atl. 174 (1928).
1Mansell v. Turner, -Utah-, 384 P. 2d 394 (1963).
2 Id at 395. There are two general types of pardons. A pardon may be given when
there is a recognition that a previous conviction was based on guilt or when
a convicted person is found to be innocent, 'as where another confesses to
the crime for which the convict was imprisoned. This article deals with the
former type of pardon only.
3 UTAH CONsT. art. I, §§3, 6, and 9.
4 U.S. CoNsT. amend V, VI, and XIV.
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